More about the rhetork of economics by Maloney, John
Documento de Trabajo 
892 3 
lWRE ABOUT THE RHETORK OF ECONOMICS 
John Maloney 





("(c/\ j¿ '3 ) 
FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS ECONOMICAS y EMPRESARIALES-UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE 
FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS ECONOMICAS y EMPRESARIALES.- UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE 
Campus de Somosaguas. 28023 - MADRID 
Eoonomists have deferred to a dead philosophy of 
soienoe for too long. They have not, for whioh heaven be 
praised, aotually oarried the philosophers' orders out; 
eoonomios would have stopped if they hado But an outdated 
methodologioal vision has haunted economists nonetheless. 
They have paid tribute to (without following) the sterile 
injunotion that suocessful prediotion is everything, and the 
tribute has been the mean and negative one of disdaining 
(while still using) all the other good honest methods of 
persuasion. As a result, eoonomists have become less 
oareful and less effective in the business of argumento The 
remedy is to stop cowering before the lordly demarcations of 
yesterday's philosophers as to what is and what is not 
soientifio practice, and to return to the more ancient wisdom 
of the rhetorician. It is time for eoonomics to listen to 
its own oonversation with a critic's ear. 
This was the message of Don McCloskey's long and brilliant 
article "The Rhetoric of Economics" (McCloskey 1983). 
MoCloskey was soon to profess surprise at the warmth of his 
artiole's reception (McCloskey 1984), yet it is hard to 
believe that he did not know how badly thousands of 
eoonomists wanted to hear what he was going to tell them. 
Economics la science, a successful sort at 
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one who and plants, for identical reasons. No 
knows the subject will deny it.' 
In this paper we look first at the methodology which 
McCloskey is attaoking (and its relationship to the 
methodology he thinks he is attacking). We then look at the 
benefits which a more rhetorical approach might bring to the 
subjeot. Lastly we take up the surprising faot that 
McCloskey omits to discuss what makes for good or bad 
rhetorio. 
1 
McCloskey, it must be emphasised, is not condemning 
all philosophers of science. Indeed he claims he is not 
condemning anything up-to-date in the philosophy of science. 
"Modernism", as he oalls his target, is an outdated church 
out of which the l.a;¡t philosopher tiptoed some decades ago, 
But those disciplines whose practice the modernists tried to 
order around typically have not heard that the orders are 
cancelled, In economics, especially, those in authority are 
distilling their all-too-unfrenzied rules of procedure from 
defunct philosophical scribblers from a good deal more than a 
few years back. 
So what are the tenets of modernism? 
as follows: 
McCloskey lists them 
1. Prediction and control is the point of science, 
2. Only the observable implications (or predictions) of a 
theory matter to its truth, 
3. Observability entails objective, reproducible experiments; 
mere questionnaires interrogating human subjetcs are useless, 
because humans might lie, 
4. If and only if an experimental implication of the theory 
proves false is the theory proved false. 
5. Objectivity is to be treasured; subjective 
(introspection) is not scientific knowledge, 
objective and subjective cannot be linked. 
"observation" 
because the 
6. Ke 1 vin 's Dictum: "When you cannot express i t in numbers, 
your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind." 
7. Introspection, metaphysical belief, aesthetics and the 
like may well figure in the discovery of an hypothesis but 
cannot figure in its justification; justifications are 
timeless, and the surrounding community of science irrelevant 
to their truth. 
8. It is the business of methodology to demarcate scientific 
reasoning form nonscientific, positive from normative. 
9. A scientific explanation of an event brings the event 
under a covering law. 
10. Scientists -- for instance, economic scientists ought 
not to have anything to say as sci~ntists about the oughts of 
value, whether of morality or arto I 
We will all, no doubt, react differently to these 
commandments, both on our own behalf and as to how far they 
represent the views of the "typical other". Has any 
economist ever believed in all ten? The only 
flesh-and-blood modernists McCloskey can find are Machlup and 
the Friedman of the (in)famous 1953 essay. And even this 
latter piece, McCloskey concedes, finds room for aesthetic 
criteria when choice of a theory is at stake, endorses 
questionnaires for suggesting (albeit not testing) 
hypotheses, and invokes the rhetorical community to which the 
scientist must speak if he is to produce conviction. 
Perhaps,' McCloskéy concludes, the fact that the locus 
classicus of economic modernism contains so mucho that is 
anti-modernist "indicates that modernism cannot survive 
intelligent discussion even by its best advocates." 
Alternatively, perhaps the fact that the only example of 
modernism that McCloskey can disinter contains so much that 
is anti-modernist indicates that modernism never existed in 
economics! 
The full-blooded modernist, in short, inhabits McCloskey's 
im~gination. To call his version a caricature would be to 
insult what can be a serious, truthful and disciplined 
art-form. Nor can his ver.sion of things be given 
credibility by arguing that economists practise the modernism 
which even Friedman only half-heartedly preaches. It is the 
whole point, or at least half the point, of McCloskey's 
thesis that economists do not and cannot live up (or down) 
to modernist prescriptions. 
There are, in fact, no more than five cursory references, 
even in the full-length McCloskey (1985) to the philosopher 
who has in reality dominated economists' talk of method these 
past twenty years -- Imre Lakatos. And before showing how 
un"modernist" ha was, it is worth stressing that economic 
methodologists since 1970 have, to aman and in almost every 
respect, been ~ modernist than Lakatos. Take Mark Blaug, 
whose "fine but wrong" book (Blaug 1980) McCloskey 
excoriates for its "authoritaria¡y" equation of science wíth 
. testability. Aftei' praising Lakatos for rejecting an 
ahistorical philosophy of science (modernist commandment 
no.7), Blaug goes on to judge the resultant attempt "to 
divorce apprraisal from recommendation, to retain a critical 
methodology of science that is frankly normative but ... 
capable of serving as the basis of a research program in the 
history of science" as "either a severely qualified success 
or else a failure, albeit a magnificent failure." 
Philosophers of science, in short, face severe problems 
whether they put in the actual practice of the scientific 
community or whether they leave it out not exactly the 
~onclusion of a paid-up subscriber to McCloskey's "ten 
commandments". 
So, if no recent economist has been 
Lakatos, where does Lakatos himself 
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possibilities: his theory is wrong, his observation is 
faulty, or there is an unrecognised disturbing factor at 
work, i.e. ceteris are not paribus. A planet whose observed 
prbit differs from that predicted, for instance, can mean (i) 
that the existing theory of gravitation and dynamics is 
incorrect (ii) that a faulty theory of optics has bred an 
inaccurate telescope or (iii) that there is some disturbing 
factor which the scientist has not considered (such as an 
undiscovered planet nearby). In other words the 
observation has refuted the con;uncture of three hypotheses: 
the gravitational-dynamic theory, the optical theorfy behind 
the telescope and the hypothesis that ceteris are paribus on 
this occasion. They cannot all be true. Which of them is 
false? The scientist's dilemma might be called the 
theory-ceteris-telescope.problem. 
Before going any further, it must be pointed out that the 
"telescope" part of the problem cannot be avoided by using 
the naked eye. Whatever the method of observation, we are 
left with a clash -- or a congruence between theories, 
Theories in science are not contradicted by facts, because 
the distinction between theory and fact is an illegitimate 
one. Even direct sensation is impregnated by expectation: 
there is thus no psyéhological demarcation between 
theoretical and observational propositions. 
"Methodological falsificationism" was Popper's first attempt 
to deal with the theory-ceteris-telescope problem. Popper 
proposed that some well-corroborated theories should, 
tentatively, provisionally and for the sole purpose of 
testing other theories, be regarded as unproblematic 
background ,knowledge, Thus a methodological 
falsificationist might decide to use'~ well-corroborated 
theory of radio-optics uncritically, as "background 
knowledge", and thus regard resulting observations as 
unproblematic "facts", He would thus be isolating the 
gravitational theory for testing" and anomalous behaviour by 
the planets would "falsify" the gravitational theory. 
"Falsify" must be kept in inverted commas, because the 
theory has not been disproved, Since the "unproblematic" 
theory may still be false, the "problematic" theory, or 
rather the conjunction of the "problematic" theory and the 
ceteris paribus clause, may still be true. 
If, however, this conjuncture is "falsified", the next step 
is to decide whether the ceteris paribus clause too should be 
relegated to "unproblematic background knowledge". To 
decide this, the scientist must specify disturbing factors 
which would violate the ceteris paribus clause, and test the 
assumptions that they exist, If many of them are refuted, 
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the ceteris paribus clause will be regarded as 
well-corroborated and join the category of "unproblematic 
background knowledge". The problematic theory will now be 
regarded as "falsified " • " 
Methodological falsificationism requires the scientist to 
make daring assumptions both before and during his 
investigations. First he must decide which theories should 
be taken as giving unproblematic background knowledge an 
operation which Popper himself likened to driving piles into 
a swamp. Then, secondly , if the conjuncture of a theory 
and a ceteris paribus clause is "falsified", he must decide 
which to drop. The procedure just mentioned for doing so 
leaves the scientist lawless and ill-advised at ,every turno 
Only if he finds a precisely quantifiable disturbing factor 
which revises prediction exactly into line with observation 
is his path ahead clear. Otherwise his decision between 
dropping the ceteris paribus clause and dropping the main 
hypothesis wil resemble the earlier dictatorial decree that 
this theory is, and that one is not, unproblematic 
background knowledge. 
Sophisticated methodological falsificationism (hereafter SMF) 
was devised by Popper to reduce the arbitrary element in 
theory testing. Under SMF a theory is falsified only if 
there is a second theory which not only explains everything 
explained by the first one, but predicts novel "facts" (i.e. 
"facts" improbable in the light of, or even forbidden by, the 
1irst theory), some 01 which have been corroborated. 
Pareto-optimality has reached the.philosophy of science! If 
T2 e~'plain's all that '"Ti explained and 'predicts novel facts, 
it is said to have excess empirical content over Ti. 11 
some of the novel facts have been corroborated, then T2 has 
corroborated excess empirical content and has falsified Ti. 
SMF, Lakatos says, reduces the arbitrary element in science. 
Of the two methodological decisions aboye, the second no 
longer has to be made ; because now, if faced with an 
inconsistency, "we do not have to decide which ingredients of 
the theory we regard as problematic we regard all 
ingredients as problematic in the light. of the conflicting 
accepted basic statement and try to replace all of them. If 
we succeed in replacing some ingredient in a 'progressive' 
way (that is, the replacement has more corroborated empfrical 
content than the original), we call it 'falsified'." In 
other words, rational criteria have been supplied for the 
choice between dropping the ceteris paribus clause and 
dropping the main hypothesis. Note, however, that there is 
still an "accepted basic statement" present ; that is the 
first methodologica¡ decision has still to be made. 8ut 
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even here, Lakatos says, the 
reduced ; such methodological 
against. 
conventional element 
decisions can now be 
can be 
appealed 
How? Let us start with Lakatos' description of the original 
methodological decision: "Whether a proposition is a 'fact' 
or a 'theory' in the context of a test depends on our 
methodological decision ••• the clash is not between 'theories 
and facts' but between two high-level theories: between 
an interpretative theory to provide the facts and 
an explanatory theory to explain them ••. the problem is which 
theory to consider the interpretative one which provides the 
'hard' facts an~ which the explanatory one which tentatively 
explains them." Lakatos he re instances the clash between 
Prout's theory (that the atomic weights of all elements are 
exact multiples of the atomic weight of hydrogen) and Stas's 
"refutation" (that the atomic weight of chlorine is 35.5.) 
The latter "fact" is fact only by assuming that Stas's 
chlorine really was pure chlorine i.e. only by taking as 
correct the theory that, if the purifying procedures used by 
stas are applied, the result will be pure chlorine. This 
theory is the interpretative theory which provides the 
"facts" ; Prout's theory is the explanatory theory which 
explains them (or in this case fails to explain them). So 
long as we chartacterise the two theories this way round, 
Prout's theory has be en refuted by "fact." 
But whichever way round the designation is made, we are in 
reality testing two or more theories for consistency with 
each other. Should there be inconsistency, the 
sophisticated falsificationist will "try to replace first 
one, then the other, then possibly both, and opt for the new 
set-up which provides the biggest increase in corroborated 
content." lf this set-up includes the original 
explanatory theory but not the original interpretative 
theory, the supporters of the explanatory thepory have 
appealed successfully. This is what actually happened with 
Prout's theory. 
But even this appeal procedure, Lakatos says, can 
only postpone the conventional decision to take some "fact" 
as fact. For the appeal is decided with regard to "increase 
in corroborated content." But an increase in corroborated 
content involves the prediction of novel facts. And to 
accept any statement as a "fact" requires a conventional 
decision about a theory. The appeal court is thus making 
its own conventional decisions. 
Let us now appraise SMF, and Lakatos's interpretation of 
with particular reference to economics. lt is often 




that, whereas the natural sciences have theories which come 
with explicit instructions about the conditions in which 
they will not apply, the social sciences have models whose 
domain is left unspecified. Such models cannot be 
falsified but only pronounced inapplicable to a particular 
case. The standard criticism of economics as a predictive 
science is that, if you can only pronounce the model 
inapplicable ex post and in the light of the observations 
which contradict it, what is the point of the model? 
The ceteris paribus isssue, then, is central to economics ; 
and the relevance of Lakatos' methodology to economics stands 
or falls with his instructions on what to do with ceteris 
paribus when theory and observation collide. 1 shall argue 
that SMF applies only when the theory or model is making 
exact quantitative predictions -- and not always then. 
Consider a prediction which is, like most economic 
predictions, purely gualitative -- that a rise in interest 
rates will reduce' investment by some unspecified amount. 
Interest rates then rise but investment rises too. We can 
now argue that some disturbing factor is at work, hunt it 
down, try to conclude something about the strength of its 
effects and thus explain the "anomaly" away. This of course 
is what economists do. But it is not scientific progress in 
the Lakatosian sense. If predictions are qualitative. the 
discovery of a disturbing factor can never genera te a new 
prediction. The point is a very simple one. Either 
disturbing factor Y agrees with model X that variable A will 
go down next week (in which case it cannot explain the 
"anomaly" that A has gone up) or it disagrees, in which case 
it simply blurs the prediction. X and Y are pulling A in 
opposite directions, neither can be quantified, and A could 
go either way. Excess empirical content, corroborated or 
not, cannot arise. Where predictions are purely 
qualitative, allowing for disturbances can only reduce 
empirical contento 
Even where economic models do make exactly quantified 
predictions, the situation is likelY to be no better. We 
have heard a paper this week which argues, in line with the 
vast bulk of evidence, that the stock market is an 
efficient market. This hypothesis leads to various precise 
predicitons that can be made about share prices. But if it 
did turn out to be the case that the stock market was 
inefficient, this could not lead to an alternative 
quantitative prediction unless the degree of inefficiency 
could be measured (and measured, of course, by some means 
other than calculating back from the observed effects.) 
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This.all seems an insup~rable stumbling block to a Lakatosian 
economics. It ii worth stressing h~w central to Lakatos' 
prescribed method the criterio~ of corroborated. excess 
empirical content is. The purpose of the criterion is to 
demarcate "progressive" from "degenerating" research 
programmes. A research programme, to Lakatos, consists of a 
hard core hypothesis, mediated and interpreted through a 
"protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses." (This is simply 
another recognition of the fact that no theory can stand 
alone, but must have its conditions of application 
specified). But, in Lakatos 's words, "theories and factual 
propositions can always be harmonised with the help of 
auxiliary hypotheses ... the problem is how to demnarcate 
between scientific and pseudoscientific adjustments, between 
rational and irrational changes of theory." Corroborated 
excess empirical content is the touchstone. But, when 
predictions are purely qualitative, auxiliary hypotheses 
never produce c.e.e.c. Hence the Lakatosian method cannot 
distinguish between scientific progress and ad hoc quackery. 
It is strange, therefore, that McCloskey should go to the 
trouble of building up a target composed of nine parts 1936 
Ayer to one part 1953 Friedman. Economic practice (as he 
admits, indeed affirms) was never like this while the 
methodological proclamations of contemporary economists slope 
away down the non-positivist track from Lakatos, who himself 
represents positivism watered down about as far as it is 
possible to go. Yet, as 1 have tried to show, there is a 
fatal defect in Lakatos 's methodology tQo as a guide ·to ·good 
economic practice : it 'fails to perform the philosopher of 
science's most basic task, that of distinguishing between a 
research programme making fruitful progress amd a research 
programme derfending its failure by spinning convenient 
epicycles. 
McCloskey, then, did not need to resort to his laboured 
fiction of the "economic modernist" in order to divest 
economics of its predictive pretensions. He could and (by 
his own rhetorical standards) should have made his case much 
more persuasive by attacking the truly prevailing methodology 
of today. 
II 
But what would McCloskey put in place of "modernism"? 
Nothing, is his original answer (McCloskey 1983). If 
economists would only free themselves from modernism's 
thrall, they .would automatical1y place more weight upon 
and give more thought to -- the ways in which they actual1y 
converse with and seek to persuade one another. Here .the 
removal of modernist commandment no.l0 (stick to the is and 
don't conBider the ought) is particularly essential. Under 
its baneful influence, McCloBkey accuses, economists have to 
pretend to abBurdities such as that they are more strongly 
persuaded that inflation is everywhere a monetary phenomenon 
than they are persuaded that it is wrong to commit murder. 
The ban on introBpection as a justifying device mean s that 
microeconomists must solemnly plough through the higher 
reaches 01 mathematical economics and econometrics to try 
(and even then fail!) to justi1y the proposition that demand 
curves normally slope downwards. Remo ve modernism, and 
serious argument can start again on value-impregnated issues. 
Permit introspection and economistB can start addressing 
their own experience to economic problems (which iB what 
every teacher does in his first lecture on elementary demansd 
theoryanyway.) 
It iB important to realise that McCloskey is not just 
another "radical critic" of "bourgeois" economics. Indeed 
he openly states his allegiance to the neoclassical school, 
though never doing much to explain it. Neoclassical 
economics, in McCloskey's view, is neither the only or even 
necessarily the worst offender when it comes to sterile 
unthinking "modernism". The Marxist view that history is 
class struggle is, to him, as narrowing as the neoclassical 
view that history is .about interaction~ between aelfish 
individuals. The downgrading by Marxi~ts of hypotheses 
which are supposed to reflect "false consciousness" is as 
impoverishing to free enquiry as is the downgrading by 
neolassicals of hypotheses which are not falsifiable in the 
Popperian sense. One wonders whether this consciously 
eyen-handed criticism of schools of thought (Austrians get 
the same treatment too) is itself a rhetorical deYice, born 
of the guess that neoclassical economists will take these 
criticisms on board the more easily if they see other schools 
of thought being beaten around the head too. ObJectiyely, 
one might expect Marxists to come less badly out 01 
McCloskey's strictures than mainstream economists. Most 
Marxists, after all, haye reacted to Popper's charge (that 
their doctrines are unfalsifiable and hence unscientific) by 
challenging the Popperian scienti1ic/unscientific demarcation 
, o 
as a coercive piece of pseudo-philosophising with no 
justification outside (or even within') the terms of 
refe~ence it itself imposes. This is the McCloskeyite line 
precisely. McCloskey is also dismissive of the view 
(Popper, 1945 ; Hutchison, 1938) that an insistence that 
theories must be in principie falsifiable is a bulwark 
against Marxist and 1ascist pretensions to infallibility 
0nder the inexorable laws of hist6ry. 
McCloskey (1988) continues the theme 
schools of thought have an equal amount 
their rhetoric more seriously. The 
spelt out in more detail than before. 
that all economic 
to gain by taking 
gains, however, are 
1) Rhetoric in economics consists of "showing to each other 
whatever numbers and symmetries and metaphors We agree should 
matter ... lgnorance of rhetoric leaves economists unable to 
confront doubts.Run another regression that no one believes. 
Deduce another consequence that no one is persuaded by. 
Adduce another institutional fact that no óne 'else sees as 
relevant."/Rhetoric, in other words, means economists talk 
directly to one another about what they find convincing. 
2) The rhetorical approach will actually raise standards of 
scientific practice, which under "modernism" are very L9.kI, 
(whatever the pretensions). "1 s i t more di ff icul t for a 
Chicago economist to produce still another regression 
'consistent with the hypothesis' of peasant rationality or .•. 
to produce a set of arguments ••. that can actually persuade an 
economist from Yale?"~ 
This is all fair enough; one can reject McCloskey's fiction 
of "modernism" as the rL!ling methodology and still ahare his 
frustration at the way most economists write up their papers: 
preamble, model, t-statistic, variant on the model, new 
t-~tatistit, summary. If economics is a place where 
arguments are seldom settled but more commonly peter OL!t 
through exhaustion and boredom, the aboye method 01 
"argument" has much to answer foro To make such a charge, 
however, does seem to call for a general analysis of what 
forms of economic rhetoric do, and what forms of rhetoric 
should, persuade different kinds of audience. McCloskey, 
one feels, is so anxious to avoid tarring himself with the 
brush of methodological authoritarianism which he wields on 
almost everyone else, that he puts all rhetorical devices on 
an equal footing. 
III 
So what are the principal devices of economic rhetoric? 
McCloskey claims that he found almost all of them on a couple 
of. pages when he opened Samuel son' s Founda tigns .9.f.._E;;.<;..onomic 
.Analysis at random. pp.122-3 of that ~jQrk feature: 
1) Mathematical virtuosity, so that Samuelson can "present 
himself as an authority. That the mathematics is sometimes 
pointless, as here, is beside the point. Being able to do 
such a difficult thing (so it would have seemed to the 
typical economist reader in 1947), is warrant of expertise." } 
2) Appeals to authority -- in these two pages Keynes, Hicks, 
Aristotle, Knight and Samuelson himself are invoked. 
3) Appeals to relaxation of assumptions Samuelson 
considers in a purely speculative way what would happen to 
the demand-for-money function when Hicks's assumption of a 
zero return on money is relaxed. "Mere speculation of this 
sort is not (for the modernist) evidence at al 1 ""2...coments 
McClos~~ey . 
4) Appeals to hypothetical toy economies (e.g. an economy 
where money does not exist) as simplifying devices. 
5) Use of analogy and metaphor. 
It is not helpful to put, as McCloskey does, all these 
devices on the same rhetorical footing. 2) and 5) in 
particular are forms of inference. We appeal to X's 
authority on this occasion because we believe him to ha ve 
been right, and we believe our audience will think he was 
right, on most other occasions. We draw an analogy between, 
say, rational expectations and profit-maximisation because we 
think that if our audience believes in the one form of 
optimisation we can convict them of inconsistency in not 
believing in the other. AII of this as sumes that prior 
probabilities are being assigned, however implicitly, to the 
hypothesis we want to defend. (This would conflict with 
"modernism" as McCloskey defines it, but not with the way 
economists actually reason.) Rhetorical devices 2) and 5), 
in short, are justified by the Bayesian probability calculus. 
J, M (. (WtJ¡ (I9 g~) ~."") O 
1.-. j~w, (>.71 
)1.. 
3) and 4) by contrast are simply different stages in the 
process of model building. A model is a model whether you 
call it a model or a toy economy the relaxation of 
assumptions is the next stage in Marshall's "method of 
successive approximation." Presumably these two devices are 
labelled rhetorical rather than modernist because they aim 
.to convince the reader by means other than empirical testing. 
But in fact Samuelson's relaxation of the 
zero-interest-on-money assumption does not seem designed to 
convine e anyone about anything it is thrown in as 
speculation and allowed to hang in the air. Where 
implications are drawn deductively from simple models of an 
economy, and then not put to any kind of test, the purpose 
must clearly be to say to the reader "here are plausible 
assumptions ; the conclusions follow inexorably you had 
better therefore accept the conclusions." Again, Friedman 
(1953) is alone in denying the validity of such a method of 
persuasion. 
1) is surely rhetorically illegitimate (and ineffective?) 
It is the only one of the five which cannot be cast in 
probabalistic terms. There is no reason why the couching of 
a message in advanced mathematical language should cause us 
to raise our prior estimate of the probability that the 
proposition concerned is true. 
So we come back to where we started. AIl five of 
Samuelson's forms of argument \10l11d be empty "figures of 
speech" to a thoroughgoing modernist. But such people do 
not exist in economics. Economists, however implicitly, 
start with subJective probabilities as to the truth of a 
hypothesis and then modify them in the light of the 
arguments they hear. AIl but the first of Samuelson's 
"rhetorical devices" listed aboye are scientifically 
respectable ways of bringing about such modification. No 
doubt economists could be more explicit about the 
probabalistic way they reason : why on earth should they not 
say "1 thought there was a 90% chance expectations were 
rational until 1 read Figlewski and Wachtel in the Review of 
Economics ªnd StSl..tisti<; .. !2. ; their evidence is so much against 
that I've now come down to 70%." In that way the basis of 
disagreement would be laid bare, and the Job of either 
resolving controversies or agreeing to disagree would be put 
in hand. McCloskey is right to attack the complacent way 
different .chools·of thought talk through one another. He 
is right to call for more rhetorical self-consciousness. 
But true self-consciousness would ask when there is and when 
there is not a logical backbone under the rhetoric. 
• 
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